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Abstract
Classically, two propositions are logically equivalent precisely when they are true under the same logical
valuations. Also, two logical valuations are distinct if, and only if, there is a formula that is true according
to one valuation, and false according to the other. By a real-valued logic we mean a many-valued logic in
the sense of Petr Hájek that is complete with respect to a subalgebra of truth values of a BL-algebra given
by a continuous triangular norm on [0, 1]. Abstracting the two foregoing properties from classical logic leads
us to two principles that a real-valued logic may or may not satisfy. We prove that the two principles are
sufficient to characterise Łukasiewicz and Gödel logic, to within extensions. We also prove that, under the
additional assumption that the set of truth values be closed in the Euclidean topology of [0, 1], the two
principles also afford a characterisation of Product logic.
1. Prologue.
At the outset of his landmark monograph [12], Petr Hájek writes:
There are various systems of fuzzy logics, not just one. We have one basic logic (BL) and three
of its most important extensions: Łukasiewicz logic, Gödel logic, and the product logic. [12, p.5].
Basic Logic is, of course, the creation of Hájek himself. One of its several virtues is to afford metamathem-
atical comparison of many-valued logics to an unprecedented degree of clarity. Our paper is intended as a
modest contribution to such comparative studies; it will soon transpire that it would have been impossible
to write it, in the possible but unfortunate worlds orphan of [12].
We assume familiarity with Basic (propositional) Logic, triangular norms (t-norms, for short), and BL-
algebras; see [12], and Section 2 for an outline. Note that in this paper ‘t-norm’ means ‘continuous t-norm’,
for the sake of brevity. We write Form for the set of formulæ over the countable collection of propositional
variables Var := {X1, X2, . . .}, with primitive connectives → (implication), & (monoidal conjunction), and
⊥ (falsum). As usual, & is semantically interpreted by a t-norm, → by its residuum, and ⊥ by 0. We adopt
the standard abbreviations, ¬α := α→ ⊥, α ∧ β := α&(α→ β), α ∨ β := ((α→ β)→ β) ∧ ((β → α)→ α),
and α↔ β := (α→ β)&(β → α). We write BL to denote Basic Logic, as axiomatised in [5, 12]. An extension
of BL is a collection of formulæ closed under the (syntactic) consequence relation of BL, and closed under
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substitutions. If M is an extension of BL, we always tacitly assume that M is consistent, we refer to M as
a many-valued logic, and we denote by ⊢M its consequence relation.
Łukasiewicz logic, denoted L, is obtained by extending BL with the axiom schema ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ. Gödel logic,
denoted G, is obtained by adding to BL the schema ϕ → (ϕ&ϕ). To obtain Product logic, written P, one
extends BL with ¬ϕ ∨ ((ϕ→ (ϕ&ψ))→ ψ). See [12, p.63, Definitions 4.2.1 and 4.1.1], and [7, Chapter I].
Over the real unit interval [0, 1] ⊆ R, consider a BL-algebra ([0, 1], ∗,→∗, 0), where ∗ : [0, 1]×[0, 1]→ [0, 1]
is a continuous t-norm with residuum →∗. By an algebra of truth values we shall mean a subalgebra T∗ of
some such BL-algebra ([0, 1], ∗,→∗, 0). Note, in particular, that {0, 1} is a subset of any algebra of truth
values. We write T∗ ⊆ [0, 1] for the underlying set of the algebra of truth values, too, i.e. for the set of truth
values itself.
We say that the pair (L , T∗) is a real-valued logic if L is an extension of BL that is complete with
respect to valuations µ : Form → T∗ into the given algebra of truth values. Any algebra of truth values
T ′∗ such that (L , T
′
∗) is a real-valued logic is said to induce L . When T∗ = [0, 1], we also say that L is
induced by the t-norm ∗. (This makes sense, recalling that →∗ is uniquely determined by ∗. See Section 2
below.) Distinct algebras of truth values may of course induce the same logic L , i.e. the same extension of
BL. When we write that L is a real-valued logic, with no reference to T∗, we mean that there is at least one
algebra of truth values T∗ that induces L .
With this machinery in place, we consider two principles that a real-valued logic L may or may not
satisfy.
P1. For every algebra T∗ of truth values inducing L , the following holds. For each α, β ∈ Form, we have
⊢L α↔ β if, and only if,
µ(α) = 1 ⇐⇒ µ(β) = 1
holds for each valuation µ : Form → T∗.
P2. For every algebra T∗ of truth values inducing L , the following holds. For each pair of valuations
µ, ν : Form → T∗, if µ 6= ν then there is a formula α ∈ Form such that µ(α) > 0 while ν(α) = 0.
Our first two results are that P1 and P2 are characteristic of G and L, respectively, to within extensions.
Theorem I. A real-valued logic (L , T∗) satisfies P1 if, and only if, L is an extension of Gödel logic.
Theorem II. A real-valued logic (L , T∗) satisfies P2 if, and only if, L is an extension of Łukasiewicz
logic.
Remark 1.1. Observe that the two preceding theorems show that in P1 and P2 one can safely replace
the initial universal quantification by an existential one. In other words, the principles P1 and P2 display
robustness with respect to the specific choice of the algebra of truth values, salva logica L .
We prove Theorem I in Section 3, and Theorem II in Section 4, after some preliminaries in Section 2.
The question arises, can one also characterise Product logic by means of general principles such as P1
and P2. We shall show how to answer this question affirmatively, under one additional assumption. Let
us say that the real-valued logic L is closed if there exists an algebra of truth values T ∗ inducing L such
that the underlying set of T ∗ is closed in the Euclidean topology of [0, 1]. Product logic is the unique
closed real-valued logic that fails both P1 and P2 hereditarily with respect to real-valued extensions, in the
following sense:
Theorem III. A closed real-valued logic L is Product logic if, and only if, L and all of its non-classical,
real-valued extensions fail P1 and P2.
We prove Theorem III in Section 5.
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The proofs of Theorems I–III are relatively straightforward applications of known facts about extensions
of Basic Logic. The interest of the present contribution, if any, is thus to be sought not so much in the
technical depth of the results, as in the significance of the two principles P1 and P2 in connection with logics
of comparative truth. Before turning to the proofs, let us therefore expound on P1 and P2 a little.
Logics fulfilling P1 share with classical logic the feature that each proposition is uniquely determined, up
to logical equivalence, by the collection of its true interpretations (that is, models), where ‘true’ in the latter
sentence is to be read as ‘true to degree 1’. In the classical case this may be conceived as a consequence
of the Principle of Bivalence, along with completeness. (Indeed, if in classical logic α and β evaluate to 1
at exactly the same µ’s, then, by bivalence, they evaluate to the same value at each µ; hence α ↔ β is a
tautology, and we therefore have ⊢ α↔ β by completeness.) Theorem I shows that, remarkably, real-valued
logics that fail the Principle of Bivalence—for instance, Gödel logic—may still satisfy P1.
Logics fulfilling P2 share with classical logic the feature that distinct models of the logic can be separated
by some formula. In more detail, classical logic has the property that if µ and ν are two distinct true
interpretations of its axioms, then there is a formula α that can tell apart the two models µ and ν, in the
sense that α is not false (i.e. true) in µ but false in ν. A logic failing P2, by contrast, must allow two
distinct true interpretations µ and ν of its axioms which are indiscernible, in the sense that no proposition
is false (i.e. evaluates to degree 0) in ν and not false (i.e. evaluates to degree > 0) in µ.1 In this precise
sense, the given real-valued semantics of such a logic is redundant, as one could identify µ and ν without any
logical loss. Theorem II shows that, remarkably, there is just one [0, 1]-valued logic—namely, Łukasiewicz
logic—capable of avoiding that redundancy, by actually telling apart any two distinct real numbers in [0, 1].
2. Preliminary facts about real-valued logics.
We outline the framework of Hájek’s Basic Logic. A (continuous) t-norm is a binary operation ∗ : [0, 1]2 →
[0, 1], continuous with respect to the Euclidean topology of [0, 1], that is associative, commutative, has 1 as
neutral element, and is monotonically non-decreasing in each argument:
∀a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] : b 6 c =⇒ a ∗ b 6 a ∗ c.
For a, b ∈ [0, 1], set a →∗ b := sup {c ∈ [0, 1] | a ∗ c 6 b}. It is well known [12, Sec. 2.1.3] that continuity
is sufficient to entail a →∗ b = max {c ∈ [0, 1] | a ∗ c 6 b}. The operation →∗ is called the residuum of ∗.
Recall that the residuum determines the underlying order, that is, a 6 b if, and only if, a→∗ b = 1. Further
recall that the subset of Form that evaluates to 1 under every valuation µ : Form → ([0, 1], ∗,→∗,⊥), is
by definition the collection of all tautologies of BL. It is one of the main achievements of [12], of course,
that this set is recursively axiomatisable by schemata, using modus ponens as the only deduction rule; see
also [5] for an improved axiomatisation. Moreover, BL is an algebraizable logic, see [12, p.25 and references
therein]; the algebras in the corresponding variety are called BL-algebras, and schematic extensions of BL
are in one-one natural correspondence with subvarieties of BL-algebras. Each t-norm ∗ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]
induces a BL-algebra ([0, 1], ∗,→∗, 0), and the variety of BL-algebras is generated by the collection of all
t-norms. More generally, each algebra of truth values as defined above is a BL-algebra. We occasionally
write ‘BL-chain’ for ‘totally ordered BL-algebra’.
Given algebras of truth-values T∗, T
′
∗ ⊆ [0, 1], we say that σ : T∗ → T
′
∗ is an isomorphism if σ is an
isomorphism of BL-algebras; equivalently, σ is a bijection, for all a, b ∈ T∗ we have σ(a ∗ b) = σ(a) ∗ σ(b),
and a 6 b implies σ(a) 6 σ(b).
Recall the three fundamental t-norms.
x⊙ y := max{0, x+ y − 1} (1)
xmin y := min{x, y} (2)
x× y := xy (3)
1It should be emphasised that there is some leeway in formulating the separating conditions µ(α) > 0 and ν(α) = 0 here:
see Corollary 4.9 below for equivalent variants.
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The associated residua evaluate to 1 for each x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x 6 y; when x > y, they are respectively
given by:
x→⊙ y := min{1, 1− x+ y}
x→min y := y
x→× y :=
y
x
The algebra of truth values T⊙ := ([0, 1],⊙,→⊙, 0) is called the standard MV-algebra; the standard Gödel
algebra, denoted Tmin, and the standard Product algebra, denoted T×, are defined analogously using (2–3)
and their residua. The important completeness theorems for L, G, and P will be tacitly assumed throughout:
they state that these logics are complete with respect to evaluations into T⊙, Tmin, and T×, respectively.
For proofs and references, consult [12, Theorems 3.2.13, 4.2.17, and 4.1.13, and passim].
In the remainder of this section we collect technical results needed in the sequel. We begin with a remark
that will find frequent application.
Remark 2.1. For any real-valued logic (L , T∗), let T
′
∗ be an algebra of truth values that is isomorphic to
T∗. Then the logic induced by T
′
∗ is again L . This follows immediately from the fact that σ(1) = 1 and
σ−1(1) = 1 for any isomorphism σ : T∗ → T
′
∗. The converse statement is false in general: it is well known
that non-isomorphic t-norms may induce the same real-valued logic. However, the following hold.
1. The only t-norm inducing G is the minimum operator, for it is the only idempotent t-norm. See [12,
Theorem 2.1.16].
2. Each t-norm inducing L is isomorphic to T⊙. See [12, Lemmata 2.1.22.(2) and 2.1.23].
3. Each t-norm inducing P is isomorphic to T×. See [12, Lemma 2.1.22.(1)].
Lemma 2.2. For any real-valued logic (L , T∗), and for any formulæ α, β ∈ Form, we have:
⊢L α↔ β ⇐⇒ ⊢L α→ β and ⊢L β → α ⇐⇒ µ(α) = µ(β) for all valuations µ : Form → T∗.
Proof. Indeed, ⊢L α↔ β iff, by the completeness of L with respect to T∗, for all valuations µ : Form → T∗
we have µ(α ↔ β) = 1 iff, since 1 is the neutral element for ∗, µ(α → β) = µ(β → α) = 1 iff, by the
completeness of L with respect to T∗, ⊢L α → β and ⊢L β → α iff, since µ(α → β) = 1 is equivalent to
µ(α) 6 µ(β) by the definition of residuum, µ(α) = µ(β).
BL-algebras are defined over the signature (∗,→,⊥). Basic hoops are the ⊥-free subreducts of BL-
algebras, the latter considered over the extended signature that includes ⊤ := ⊥ → ⊥. Conversely, BL-
algebras are bounded basic hoops, that is, basic hoops with a minimum element which interprets the new
constant ⊥. Let now (I,6) be a totally ordered set, and let {Ci}i∈I be a family of totally ordered basic
hoops, where Ci := (Ci, ∗i,→i, 1). Assume further that Ci ∩ Cj = {1} for each i 6= j ∈ I. Then the ordinal
sum of the family {Ci}i∈I is the structure
2
⊕
i∈I
Ci :=
(⋃
i∈I
Ci, ∗ ,→, 1
)
,
where
x ∗ y =


x ∗i y if x, y ∈ Ci,
y if x ∈ Ci, y ∈ Cj \ {1}, i > j,
x otherwise,
2Usage of the symbol ⊕ to denote ordinal sums seems fairly standard. It is also standard to use ⊕ to denote Łukasiewicz’s
strong disjunction, see [4]. This we will do in Section 4, where context should prevent confusion.
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and
x→ y =


x→i y if x, y ∈ Ci,
y if x ∈ Ci, y ∈ Cj , i > j,
1 otherwise.
Each Ci is called a summand of the ordinal sum.
Lemma 2.3 (The Mostert-Shields Structure Theorem). Each algebra of truth values ([0, 1], ∗,→∗, 0) is
isomorphic to an ordinal sum of bounded basic hoops, each of which is isomorphic to one among T⊙, Tmin,
T×, and {0, 1}.
Proof. This is essentially [14, Theorem B].
Lemma 2.4. Let A be a subalgebra of an ordinal sum
⊕
i∈I Bi. Then there exists J ⊆ I and algebras
{Cj | j ∈ J} such that Cj is a subalgebra of Bj for each j ∈ J , and A ∼=
⊕
j∈J Cj.
Proof. Direct inspection of the definition of ordinal sum.
MV-algebras [4] are (term equivalent to) BL-algebras satisfying the equation ¬¬x = x, where ¬x is short
for x→ ⊥. Wajsberg hoops are the ⊥-free subreducts of MV-algebras; equivalently, MV-algebras are exactly
the bounded Wajsberg hoops.
Lemma 2.5. Each finite BL-chain splits into an ordinal sum of finitely many finite MV-chains.
Proof. This is [1, Theorem 3.7], together with the observation that finite Wajsberg hoops are necessarily
bounded.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose the algebra of truth values T∗ is not a subalgebra of T⊙. Then T∗ splits into a
non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two summands.
Proof. If T∗ is finite, from Lemma 2.5 it follows that T∗ is isomorphic to an ordinal sum of finitely many
finite MV-chains. Since, by assumption, T∗ is not a subalgebra of T⊙, the ordinal sum must contain at least
two summands.
If T∗ is an infinite subalgebra of [0, 1], by Lemmata 2.3 and 2.4 it follows that T∗ is isomorphic to an
ordinal sum
⊕
i∈I Ci where each summand Ci is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T⊙, Tmin, or T×. If the index
set I has at least two elements, we are done; otherwise, by the hypotheses T∗ is isomorphic to a subalgebra
of Tmin or of T×, and it has more than two elements. Now, by direct inspection, Tmin is isomorphic to⊕
r∈[0,1){0, 1}, while T× is isomorphic to {0, 1} ⊕ C, where C = ( (0, 1],×,→×, 1 ) is known as the standard
cancellative hoop. Any subalgebra of Tmin with more than two elements is then a non-trivial ordinal sum of
copies of {0, 1}, while any subalgebra of T× distinct from {0, 1} is of the form {0, 1} ⊕ C
′, for C′ a subhoop
of C. In both cases, T∗ splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two summands.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose the algebra of truth values T∗ splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two
summands, say
⊕
i∈I Ci, where each Ci is a totally ordered basic hoop, and |I| > 2. Then I has a least
element, say i0. Further, let S ⊆ T∗ be the support of a summand distinct from Ci0 . For any two valuations
µ, ν : Form → T∗ such that µ(Var), ν(Var) ⊆ S, and for any α ∈ Form, we have:
µ(α) = 0 ⇐⇒ ν(α) = 0.
Proof. Since T∗ is bounded below, the existence of i0 follows from inspection of the definition of ordinal
sum.
We first prove the following claim by induction on the structure of formulæ: For any valuation µ : Form →
T∗ such that µ(Var) ⊆ S, and for any α ∈ Form, we have µ(α) ∈ S ∪ {0}.
If α is either ⊥ or α ∈ Var, the claim holds trivially. Suppose α = β&γ. By the induction hypothesis,
µ(β), µ(γ) ∈ S ∪ {0}. If both µ(β), µ(γ) ∈ S then, by the definition of ordinal sum, µ(β&γ) ∈ S, too. If
at least one among β and γ, say β, is such that µ(β) = 0, then µ(β&γ) = 0. Hence µ(β&γ) ∈ S ∪ {0}
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for all µ such that µ(Var) ⊆ S. Next suppose α = β → γ. If µ(β) 6 µ(γ), then µ(β → γ) = 1 ∈ S.
If µ(β) > µ(γ) ∈ S then, by the definition of ordinal sum, µ(β → γ) ∈ S, too. Finally, if µ(β) ∈ S and
µ(γ) = 0, then µ(β → γ) = 0. In all cases µ(β → γ) ∈ S ∪ {0}. This settles the claim.
Consider now µ, ν : Form → T∗ such that µ(Var), ν(Var) ⊆ S, and any formula α ∈ Form. It suffices
to show that µ(α) = 0 implies ν(α) = 0. By the preceding claim, we have µ(α), ν(α) ∈ S ∪{0}. We proceed
again by induction on the structure of formulæ. The base cases α = ⊥ or α ∈ Var hold trivially. Let
α = β&γ. The definition of ordinal sum entails that µ(β&γ) = 0 can only occur if at least one of µ(β) and
µ(γ), say µ(β), lies in the first summand Ci0 . By the preceding claim, µ(β) = 0. By induction ν(β) = 0, and
therefore ν(β&γ) = 0. Let α = β → γ. Assume µ(β → γ) = 0. The definition of ordinal sum entails either
µ(β) > µ(γ) = 0, or both µ(β), µ(γ) ∈ Ci0 . In the latter case, the preceding claim shows µ(β) = µ(γ) = 0,
and therefore µ(β → γ) = 1, which is a contradiction. In the former case, by induction ν(β) > ν(γ) = 0.
By the preceding claim, ν(β) ∈ S. By the definition of ordinal sum ν(β → γ) = 0. This completes the
proof.
3. Logics satisfying P1.
Lemma 3.1. For any real-valued logic (L , T∗), we have:
L extends G ⇐⇒ T∗ is a subalgebra of Tmin.
Moreover, we have:
L extends G properly (i.e. L 6= G) ⇐⇒ T∗ is a finite subalgebra of Tmin.
Proof. L extends G iff ⊢L X1 ↔ X1&X1 iff, by Lemma 2.2, µ(X1) = µ(X1) ∗ µ(X1) for any valuation
µ : Var → T∗ iff a = a ∗ a for any a ∈ T∗ iff T∗ is a subalgebra of Tmin. (The latter equivalence follows
from Remark 2.1.1.) Now, if L extends G properly, then, by Remark 2.1.1, and the fact that each infinite
subalgebra of Tmin induces G [8, Theorem 4], the underlying set of T∗ cannot be an infinite subset of [0, 1],
hence T∗ is a finite subalgebra of Tmin. The other direction follows from [12, Corollary 4.2.15], stating that
any two finite subalgebras of Tmin of the same cardinality are isomorphic, and from the axiomatisation of
the subvariety of Gödel algebras generated by the n-element chain, essentially given in [11].
Lemma 3.2. Any real-valued logic that satisfies P1 is an extension of G.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive: a real-valued logic L that does not extend G fails P1. Indeed, by the
hypothesis we have 6⊢L X1 ↔ X1&X1. On the other hand, for any algebra of truth values T∗ inducing L ,
and for any valuation µ : Form → T∗, we have
µ(X1) = 1 ⇒ µ(X1&X1) = 1, (4)
µ(X1&X1) = 1 ⇒ µ(X1) = 1. (5)
Indeed, (4) holds by the very definition of t-norm, which includes the condition 1 ∗ 1 = 1; and (5) holds by
the fact that t-norms are non-increasing in both arguments, whence µ(X1&X1) 6 µ(X1). Now (4–5) show
that L fails P1 for α = X1 and β = X1&X1.
For the proof of the next lemma we recall the notion of semantic consequence with respect to an algebra
of truth values T∗. Given a set Γ ⊆ Form and α ∈ Form, we say that α is a semantic consequence of Γ
with respect to T∗, in symbols Γ T∗ α if, for any valuation µ : Var → T∗, the fact that µ(γ) = 1 for each
γ ∈ Γ implies µ(α) = 1.
Lemma 3.3. Any real-valued logic L that is an extension of G satisfies P1.
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Proof. Let T∗ be an algebra of truth values inducing L . By Lemma 3.1 we know that T∗ is a subalgebra
of Tmin. Let α, β ∈ Form be such that µ(α) = 1 iff µ(β) = 1, for each valuation µ : Form → T∗. By the
definition of semantic consequence, we have α T∗ β and β T∗ α. Recall that G is strongly complete with
respect to Tmin ([12, Theorem 4.2.17.(2)]). By Lemma 3.1, each real-valued extension L of G distinct from
G is induced by a finite subalgebra of Tmin, and it is moreover strongly complete with respect to any such
(essentially unique) subalgebra ([6, Proposition 4.18 and Corollary 4.19]). In all cases we therefore infer
α⊢L β and β ⊢L α. The logic G has the Deduction Theorem by [12, Theorem 4.2.10.(1)], and the same
proof shows that each extension of G also has the Deduction Theorem. We thereby obtain ⊢L β → α and
⊢L α→ β. Hence, by Lemma 2.2, we conclude ⊢L α↔ β, as was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem I. Combine Lemmata 3.2 and 3.3.
Remark 3.4. Theorem I holds even if we relax the notion of real-valued logic considerably. Recall that
MTL (monoidal t-norm-based logic) is the logic of all left-continuous t-norms and their residua [10]; write
Form
′ for the set of well-formed formulæ of MTL. (In contrast to BL, here it is necessary to regard the
lattice-theoretic conjunction ∧ as primitive.) The algebraic semantics corresponding to MTL is provided by
MTL-algebras. By a standard MTL-algebra we mean an MTL-algebra induced by a left-continuous t-norm
on [0, 1] and its residuum. Now replace the definition of real-valued logic by the following. The pair (L , T∗)
is a real-valued logic if L is an extension of MTL that is complete with respect to valuations µ : Form′ → T∗
into an arbitrary MTL-subalgebra T∗ of some standard MTL-algebra. It is well known that Remark 2.1.1
holds even if we consider all left-continuous t-norms instead of the continuous ones only. And it is possible
to show that Lemmata 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 continue to hold. Hence Theorem I holds for real-valued logics in
the present sense.
4. Logics satisfying P2.
Lemma 4.1. For any real-valued logic (L , T∗), we have:
L extends L ⇐⇒ T∗ is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T⊙.
Moreover, we have:
L extends L properly (i.e. L 6= L) ⇐⇒ T∗ is isomorphic to a finite subalgebra of T⊙.
Proof. L extends L iff ⊢L ¬¬X1 ↔ X1 iff (by Lemma 2.2) µ(X1) = ¬¬µ(X1) for any valuation µ : Var →
T∗ iff a = ¬¬a for any a ∈ T∗ iff (by Remark 2.1.2) T∗ is an MV-algebra with some underlying set
U ⊆ [0, 1]. Now, if U is finite, say of cardinality n, then T∗ is isomorphic to the MV-chain Tn−1 =
{ 0
n−1 ,
1
n−1 , . . . ,
n−2
n−1 ,
n−1
n−1}, by [4, Proposition 3.6.5], and direct inspection shows that Tn−1 is a subalgebra
of T⊙. Assume then that U is infinite. Observe that T∗ cannot be a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two
summands: consider such a sum B⊕C, and take 1 6= c ∈ C. Then ¬¬c = 1 6= c, and hence B⊕C is not an
MV-algebra. By Lemma 2.6 and by Remark 2.1.2, T∗ is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T⊙. Clearly, if T∗ is
isomorphic to a subalgebra of T⊙ then L extends L. This proves the first statement. Each finite MV-chain
generates a proper subvariety of the variety of MV-algebras (see [4, Theorem 8.5.1] for axiomatisations).
Thus, if T∗ is isomorphic to a finite subalgebra of T⊙ then L extends L properly. On the other hand, by
[4, Theorem 8.1.1], every infinite subalgebra of T⊙ generates the whole variety of MV-algebras. This fact,
together with the first assertion of the lemma, suffices to complete the proof.
Lemma 4.2. Any real-valued logic L that satisfies P2 is an extension of L.
Proof. By contraposition, suppose L is not an extension of L. If T∗ is an algebra of truth values that
induces L , then T∗ is not a subalgebra of T⊙: for, given that T⊙ does induce L (cf. Remark 2.1), any such
subalgebra clearly induces an extension of L. Hence, by Lemma 2.6, T∗ splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum
of at least two summands. With the notation therein, there exists a summand S of T∗ distinct from the first
one that is non-trivial, and thus contains two distinct elements v 6= w. Let µv be the unique valuation that
sends each variable to v, and let νw be the unique valuation that sends each variable to w. Evidently, we
have µv 6= νw, so that µv and νw fail P2 by Lemma 2.7.
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Remark 4.3. Let (L , T∗) be a real-valued logic. In the next lemma we say, somewhat informally, that “L
satisfies P2 with respect to T∗”, to mean that for any two valuations µ 6= ν : Form → T∗ there is α ∈ Form
with µ(α) > 0 and ν(α) = 0.
Lemma 4.4. Let (L , T∗) be a real-valued logic, and let σ : T∗ → T
′
∗′ be an isomorphism, where T
′
∗′ is an
algebra of truth values. The logic induced by T ′∗′ is again L , by Remark 2.1. Then L satisfies P2 with
respect to T∗ if, and only if, L satisfies P2 with respect to T
′
∗′ .
Proof. Since σ−1 : T ′∗′ → T∗ is an isomorphism, too, it suffices to show that L satisfies P2 with respect to
T ′∗′ if L satisfies P2 with respect to T∗. Proof by contraposition. Let µ 6= ν : Form → T
′
∗′ be valuations
that fail P2. Thus, for all formulæ α ∈ Form, we have µ(α) = 0 if, and only if, ν(α) = 0. Write FreeLℵ0 for
the Lindenbam algebra of the logic L . As usual, we may identify formulæ, modulo the logical-equivalence
relation induced by ⊢L , with elements of Free
L
ℵ0
; and valuations with homomorphisms from FreeLℵ0 to T∗
(or to T ′∗′ , as the case may be). Then the compositions σ
−1 ◦ µ and σ−1 ◦ ν are valuations into T∗, see the
commutative diagram below.
FreeLℵ0 T∗
T ′∗′
σ−1 ◦ µ
σ−1 ◦ ν
µ
ν
σ−1
It is not the case that σ−1 ◦µ = σ−1 ◦ ν: for else µ = ν would follow by pre-composing with σ. Now for any
α ∈ Form we have:
µ(α) = 0 iff ν(α) = 0 (by assumption),
σ−1(0) = 0 (homomorphisms preserve 0),
σ−1(µ(α))) = 0 iff σ−1(ν(α))) = 0 (by composition).
Hence L fails P2 with respect to T∗, as was to be shown.
Lemma 4.5. Łukasiewicz logic L satisfies P2.
Remark 4.6. A proof of Lemma 4.5 can be obtained as a consequence of McNaughton’s Theorem [4, 9.1];
in fact, the proof can be reduced to the one-variable case [4, 3.2]. Here we give a proof that uses a weaker
(and simpler) result from [2], thus showing that the full strength of McNaughton’s Theorem is not needed
to fulfill P2.
Proof. In light of Remark 2.1.2 and Lemma 4.4, it suffices to show that L satisfies P2 with respect to the
Łukasiewicz t-norm ⊙ on [0, 1]. For terms s and t over the binary monoidal operation ⊙ and the unary
operation ¬, set s⊕ t := ¬(¬s⊙¬t). Let us write nt as a shorthand for t⊕ · · · ⊕ t (n− 1 occurrences of ⊕),
and tn as a shorthand for t⊙ · · · ⊙ t (n− 1 occurrences of ⊙). We inductively define the set of basic literals
(in the variables Xi, i = 1, 2, . . .) as follows.
• Xi is a basic literal;
• each term s either of the form s = nt or of the form s = tn, for some integer n > 0, is a basic literal,
provided that t is a basic literal;
• nothing else is a basic literal.
8
Given integers n1 > 1, and n2, . . . , nu > 1, we write (n1, n2, . . . , nu)Xi to denote the basic literal
(· · · ((ni · · · ((n1Xi)
n2 · · · ))ni+1) · · · ).
In this proof, a term function is any function λτ : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] induced by interpreting over the standard
MV-algebra T⊙ = ([0, 1],⊙,¬, 0) a term τ whose variables are contained in {X1, . . . , Xn}. Below we also
use the interpretation of the definable lattice connective ∧ as the minimum operator.
Claim 4.7. For any integer n > 1, and for any two points p 6= q ∈ [0, 1]n, there is a term τ whose term
function λτ : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] takes value 0 at q, and value > 0 at p.
Proof. Since p 6= q there exists an integer i > 1 such that p(i) 6= q(i), that is, p and q differ at one of their
coordinates. If q(i) < p(i) then there are integers h, k > 0 such that q(i) < h
k
< p(i), with h and k coprime.
By [2, Corollary 2.8] there is a basic literal L = (a1, . . . , au)Xi such that λ
−1
L (0) is the set [0,
h
k
]× [0, 1]n−1,
and λL is monotone increasing in the variable Xi. Hence λL(p) > 0 and λL(q) = 0. If p(i) 6 q(i) for all
integers i > 1, then one can choose j such that p(j) < q(j). As before there are integers h, k > 0 such
that p(j) < h
k
< q(j), with h and k coprime, and there is a basic literal R = (b1, . . . , bw)Xi such that
λ−1R (1) is the set [
h
k
, 1]× [0, 1]n−1, and λR is monotone increasing in the variable Xi. Hence λ¬R(p) > 0 and
λ¬R(q) = 0.
The proof is now completed by a routine translation of Claim 4.7 from terms to formulæ of L.
Remark 4.8. In connection with Claim 4.7, let us observe that term functions in Łukasiewicz logic (even
over an arbitrarily large set I of propositional variables) enjoy an even stronger separation property. Recall
(see e.g. [9, 1.5]) that a space is completely regular if it is T1, and points can be separated from closed sets
by continuous [0, 1]-valued functions. Now, in each product space [0, 1]I, points can be separated from closed
sets by term functions. Thus the space of standard models [0, 1]I may be described as definably completely
regular. The proof is essentially the same as the one above, mutatis mutandis; cf. [13, Lemma 3.5].
Proof of Theorem II. In light of Lemmata 4.2 and 4.5, it remains to show that each real-valued exten-
sion of L that is not L itself satisfies P2. By Lemmata 4.1 and 4.4, we may safely assume that L is
induced by a finite subalgebra T∗ of T⊙. By [4, Proposition 3.6.5], each such subalgebra is isomorphic to
Tm =
{
0
m
, 1
m
, . . . , m−1
m
, m
m
}
, for a uniquely determined integer m > 1. Notice now that if p 6= q are in T nm
then the term function λ′τ obtained by restricting to T
n
m the function λτ : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] provided by Claim
4.7 is such that λ′τ (q) = 0 while λ
′
τ (p) > 0. Hence L satisfies P2, and the proof is complete.
To conclude this section, let us discuss two alternative formulations of P2. We consider the following
conditions, for every algebra T∗ of truth values inducing L .
P2′. For each pair of valuations µ, ν : Form → T∗, if µ 6= ν then there is a formula α ∈ Form such that
µ(α) < 1 while ν(α) = 1.
P2′′. For each pair of valuations µ, ν : Form → T∗, if µ 6= ν then there is a formula α ∈ Form such that
µ(α) = 0 while ν(α) = 1.
Corollary 4.9. A real-valued logic satisfies P2 if, and only if, it satisfies P2′ if, and only if, it satisfies
P2′′.
Proof. Let T∗ be an algebra of truth-values inducing the real-valued logic L . It suffices to prove that if L
is an extension of L then it satisfies P2′ and P2′′, and otherwise it fails both.
Assume first that L is an extension of L. Given valuations µ 6= ν with values in T∗, by Theorem II there
is a formula α be such that µ(α) > 0 and ν(α) = 0. Then µ(¬α) < 1 and ν(¬α) = 1. Hence P2′ holds. We
now show that P2′ implies P2′′. In light of Remark 2.1.2 and Lemma 4.4, we may safely assume that T∗ is
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a subalgebra of T⊙. Then, if µ(α) < 1 and ν(α) = 1, it is clear by the definition of ⊙ that there exists an
integer k > 1 such that µ(αk) = 0 and ν(αk) = 1, where α1 = α and αn = α⊙ αn−1.
Assume now T∗ does not induce an extension of L. By Theorem II, there are distinct valuations µ and
ν such that ν(α) = 0 implies µ(α) = 0 for any formula α. This suffices to show that P2′′ fails. For what
concerns P2′, recall that, by Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 2.6, T∗ splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum of at
least two summands. Let µ be the valuation assigning 1 to every variable. Then it is easy to check that
µ(α) ∈ {0, 1} for each formula α. Let ν be a valuation such that ν(Var) is contained in a summand of T∗
distinct from the first one. Then, by Lemma 2.7, for each formula α we have ν(α) = 0 iff µ(α) = 0, and
hence ν(α) = 1 implies µ(α) = 1, that is, P2′ fails.
5. Product logic.
Lemma 5.1. The only many-valued logic that extends P properly is classical logic.
Proof. This is essentially [3, Corollary 2.10].
Lemma 5.2. Product logic P fails both P1 and P2.
Proof. (P1) Choose the standard product algebra T× to induce P. It follows directly from the definition
of t-norm that µ(X1) = 1 if, and only if, µ(X1&X1) = 1, for any valuation µ : Form → T×. To see that
P1 fails, it thus suffices to observe that 6⊢P X1 ↔ X1&X1: for else, by soundness and Lemma 2.2, we would
have µ(X1&X1) = µ(X1)µ(X1) = µ(X1) whatever µ is; this is a contradiction.
(P2) By Remark 2.1.3 and Lemma 4.4, it suffices to argue about the product t-norm T×. By direct
inspection, we have the decomposition T× = {0, 1} ⊕ C, where C is the standard cancellative hoop. The
hypotheses of Lemma 2.7 are therefore satisfied, and hence P2 fails for any two valuations µ 6= ν : Form →
T× such that µ(Var), ν(Var) ⊆ C.
Lemma 5.3. Let L be a closed real-valued logic all of whose non-classical, real-valued extensions fail P1
and P2. Then L = P.
Proof. We know that L is not an extension of G or L, by Theorems I and II. Let T∗ be any algebra of truth
values inducing L . We will show that T∗ cannnot be finite, to begin with.
If T∗ is finite, by Lemma 2.5 we know that T∗ splits into an ordinal sum of finitely many finite MV-chains.
If there is just one summand, then L is an extension of L, and this is a contradiction. If there is more than
one summand then, by the definition of ordinal sum, and using the fact that each summand is bounded
below by 0, there is an idempotent element 0, 1 6= e ∈ T∗. The subset G3 := {0, e, 1} ⊆ T∗ is closed under the
BL-algebraic operations, as is checked easily, and all of its elements are idempotent. Hence G3 is isomorphic
to the three-element Gödel algebra. Now consider the collection E of formulæ that evaluate to 1 under each
valuation into G3. Obviously E ⊇ L , and E is closed under substitutions by its very definition. Hence E is
a real-valued extension of L which by construction is three-valued Gödel logic. Theorem I implies that E
satisfies P1, and we have reached a contradiction.
We may therefore suppose that T∗ has an infinite closed subset of [0, 1] as its support. By definition,
T∗ extends to a BL-algebra ([0, 1], ∗
′,→∗′ , 0). By Lemmata 2.3 and 2.4, T∗ decomposes into an ordinal sum⊕
i∈I Ci, where each summand Ci is isomorphic to a subalgebra of one amongst T⊙, Tmin, and T×. If the
index set I has more than one element, then using again the fact that each summand Ci is bounded below
by 0, we have an idempotent element 0, 1 6= e ∈ T∗, and hence {0, e, 1} is a three-element Gödel subalgebra
of T∗. We then reason as above to conclude that L has three-valued Gödel logic as an extension, reaching
a contradiction. Hence I is a singleton, that is, T∗ is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T⊙, Tmin, and T×. Using
Remark 2.1, and Theorems I and II, T∗ cannot be isomorphic to a subalgebra of T⊙ — because it fails P2 —
nor can it be isomorphic to a subalgebra of Tmin — because it fails P1. Then T∗ is isomorphic to an infinite
subalgebra of T×, and hence L = P, by [3, Corollary 2.9].
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Proof of Theorem III. Lemmata 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
Remark 5.4. Theorem III fails if we drop the assumption that L be closed. Indeed, consider the logic L
induced by {0, 1}⊕ C ⊕ C, where C is the standard cancellative hoop (see the proof of Lemma 2.6). Then it
can be verified that L is not closed, that L is not P, and that all of its non-classical, real-valued extensions
fail P1 and P2.
6. Epilogue.
Let us return to Hájek’s Programme, as embodied in [12]. According to Hájek, a real-valued logic may
be considered as a “ logic of imprecise (vague) propositions” [12, p.vii], wherein “truth [. . . ] is a matter of
degree” [12, p.2]. Classical logic may be viewed as a limiting case, where only two degrees of truth, 0 and 1,
exist. But as soon as a logic is genuinely real-valued, it must renounce at least one of the familiar features
P1 and P2 of the classical world. We record this fact as a formal statement, by way of conclusion.
Corollary. A real-valued logic L satisfies P1 and P2 if, and only if, L is classical logic if, and only if,
T∗ = {0, 1} is the unique algebra of truth values that induces L .
Proof. That L is classical logic just in case L satisfies P1 and P2 follows from Theorems I–II upon observing
that the only common extension of G and L is classical logic, by [12, Theorem 4.3.9.(1)]. It thus remains to
show that L is classical logic if, and only if, T∗ = {0, 1} as soon as T∗ induces L . By the very definition
of t-norm, T∗ = {0, 1} induces classical logic. On the other hand, if there exists a ∈ T∗ \ {0, 1} then
max {a, a→∗ 0} < 1. Indeed, a →∗ 0 = 1 would entail a ∗ 1 = 0 for a > 0, which is impossible. Any
valuation µ : Form → T∗ that sends X1 to a is therefore such that µ(X1 ∨ ¬X1) < 1, and the logic induced
by T∗ cannot be classical.
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